![]() ![]() Should Britain lose significant pieces of her Empire, the will to fight could easily decline among the British people and even more dangerously among the peoples of the Dominions. Though they recognized the ridiculous nature of the British plan, they saw the importance of retaining British prestige as more than ego satisfaction. President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had a broader view. ![]() The American naval leadership had no intention of denuding the West Coast to protect the British Empire. Pacific Fleet to Singapore, apparently delivered in all seriousness by liaison Roger Bellairs during joint staff talks, met with stunned disbelief and private scorn. The 1920’s and 1930’s had been a time of Anglo-American naval rivalry, and some American admirals still carried a powerful dislike for their Royal Navy counterparts. The Japanese threat grew closer when they took Hainan Island off the southern coast of China in early 1939, and much closer when they occupied French Indo-China in September 1940. Those earlier plans had been drafted when the nearest Japanese bases were on Formosa, and strike aircraft lacked the range and potency they would have by 1940. Prior thinking had placed Singapore at the center of British defense strategy, and War Plan Matador had the Royal Navy fighting in the South China Sea to hold the so-called Malay Barrier. British planning for a war in the Indian Ocean began in earnest in the late 1930’s.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |